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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. WICKES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Case No. 
12598 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BETTY J. WICKES 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover $10,000 as the 
"death benefit" owing under an automobile policy 
issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both parties moved for Summary Judgment in 
the lower court based upon· Answers to Interroga-
tories, Answers to Requests for Admission, Affi-
davits and depositions. The District Court, the Hon-
orable D. Frank Wilkins, granted the defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Th.e Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment 
in favor of the defendant and Judgment in favor 
1 
of the plaintiff, or in the alternative, that the matter 
be remanded for trial in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Homer W. Wickes and his wife, Betty Wickes, 
were residents of Salt Lake City and were named 
insureds on a policy of insurance issued by the de-
fendant insurance company. The policy originally 
was to cover the period from February 1, 1967, to 
August 1, 1967. The policy was periodically renewed 
at six-month intervals and was in continuous force 
from February 1, 1967, to August 1, 1969, with the 
exception of a brief lapse from February 2 to Feb-
ruary 17, 1969. Two policies were issued by the 
defendant to the Wickes family, one covering a 
Volkswagen automobile and the policy in question 
covering a 1962 Oldsmobile. The policy in question 
(which is attached to the defendant's Request for 
Admissions) provided what is known as "S Cover-
age" which provided for death indemnity in the 
amount of $10,000 in the event of the death of a 
named insured resulting from an accident and sus-
tained while occupying an automobile (Insuring 
Agreement IV, page 7 of the Policy). The Policy 
provided that payments under the "S Coverage" 
shall be made to the insured or to his surviving 
spouse. 
On August 2, 1969, Homer Wickes was killed 
as the result of an automobile collision while he 
was occupying the other owned and insured auto-
mobile, i.e. the Volkswagen. 
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Sometime prior to August 1, 1969, a semi-an-
nual premium notice was sent to the insureds re-
questing payment of a premium in the amount of 
$48.00. This notice provided that payment by the 
due date, August 1, 1969, "continues this Policy in 
force for six months." This notice was found sev-
eral days after Homer's death by Jim Wickes, the 
oldest son of Betty and Homer Wickes, in the office 
in the church of which Homer Wickes was the min-
ister. On about August 4, 1969, Jim Wickes con-
tacted Mr. Starbuck, an agent of the defendant 
insurance company with whom the Wickes family 
had previously dealt. Jim informed Mr. Starbuck 
of his father's death and a discussion was had as 
to the existence of "S Coverage" on one or more of 
the policies issued by the defendant to the "'Wickes 
family (deposition of James Wickes, page 6; Affi-
davit of James Starbuck, paragraph 6). 
Mr. Starbuck, in his Affidavit, stated that he 
informed Jim on the telephone that the policy was 
expired and that there would be no coverage for 
Homer's death unless the premium was paid within 
ten days from August 1. Jim Wickes testified in 
his deposition that he did not specifically recall Mr. 
Starbuck informing him of the 10-day time period. 
(deposition of James Wickes, page 30, 31), and he 
thinks that if he had been specifically told that, he 
would have in fact paid the overdue premium in 
the time period required (deposition of James 
Wickes, page 13). There was apparently some con-
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fusion at that time as to which policy Mr. Starbuck 
was referring, as Jim Wickes testified that he saw 
no reason to pay for insurance on an automobile 
that had already been in an accident, i.e. the Volks-
wagen (deposition of James Wickes, page 15). 
James Wickes recalled that there was some pro-
vision somewhere in the policy to the effect that it 
did not have to be paid exactly on time, but his 
recollection on this point is vague (deposition of 
James Wickes, page 8, 20). While not appearing 
in the record, it should be noted that subsequent 
to his deposition Jim Wickes was killed in the crash 
of a military plane.) 
The entire Wickes family was in a confused 
situation during this period of time, as the entire 
family went to Indiana for the funeral of Homer, 
returned to Salt Lake, and then moved to Glendale, 
Arizona, all between August 2 and August 13, 1969. 
Betty Wickes testified that she had very little 
to do with the financial affairs of the family, these 
matters being handled by her late husband ( depo-
sition of Betty Wickes, page 11-12), and that she 
had no conversations personally with Mr. Starbuck. 
On about August 13, 1969, at Jim's request, she 
wrote out the check for $48.00 and mailed it to 
Mr. Starbuck in Salt Lake City. This check was 
accepted and cashed by the defendant insurance 
company. 
Betty Wickes testified that her husband occa-
4 
sionally paid the premiums late (deposition of Betty 
Wickes, page 29), and on at least one occasion the 
premium was paid after the 10-day period had 
lapsed (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, paragraph 3). 
Sometime after August 1, 1969, a premium 
notice similar to that attached to Mr. Smith's Affi-
davit as Exhibit 2 was mailed to the insureds. That 
notice (hereinafter referred to as the "10-40 no-
tice") provided that payment within 10 days of the 
due date (August 1, 1969) would reinstate the 
policy as of August 1 and coverage would be con-
tinuous; a payment received after 10 days, but 
before the expiration of 40 days, would reinstate 
the policy as of the date the premium was received. 
This "10-40 notice" is not signed or executed by 
either the insured or the insurance company. Nei-
their Betty Wickes nor Jim Wickes were ever aware 
of, nor to their knowledge had they ever seen, this 
particular type of premium notice. After the $48.00 
check had been mailed by Betty Wickes to Mr. Star-
buck, she received another premium notice from the 
insurance company. As she had already sent in the 
premium payment, she called her son Jim (who was 
then in Florida on active duty with the Navy) to 
inquire as to what she should do. Jim advised her 
to contact the nearest agent of the insurance com-
pany. On or about September 3, 1969, she contacted 
Mr. Osborne, an agent of defendant in Glendale, 
Arizona, and made inquiry as to the proper course 
of action (deposition of Betty Wickes, page 14-15). 
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She wanted to make sure that there was complete 
coverage straight through, with no policy lapse, so 
that her husband's accident would be covered ( depo-
sition of Betty Wickes, page 16). Mr. Osborne told 
her that she should mail in another check, but that 
she was covered and there was no problem. She 
understood from Mr. Osborne that she would be 
completely covered for the entire period of time 
( deposition of Betty Wickes, page 20, 22). Sub-
sequently, her second check was returned to her 
uncashed. However, the $48.00 check dated August 
13 was accepted and cashed by the company. 
Betty Wickes later received another policy from 
the insurance company indicating that insurance 
had been reinstated as of August 18, 1969, and 
which was to expire on the normal six-month anni-
versary date, February 1, 1970. The defendant 
claims that the reason the entire premium was ac-
cepted for a shorter period of time was because pre-
mium rates were higher in Arizona than in Salt 
Lake City (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, paragraph 4). 
At no time prior to the issuance of the new policy 
was Betty Wickes ever informed of this fact, nor 
of the company's intention to write a shorter policy 
period for the same premium. Betty Wickes testi-
fied that when she mailed the checks her interest 
was in having continuous coverage and that she 
assumed that since she paid the entire amount of 
the premium that she was in fact covered and t~at 
if the company was going to write a shorter pohcy 
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period then she should have been paying a smaller 
premium ( deposition of Betty Wickes, page 22) . 
At all times material in this lawsuit the defendant 
had knowledge of all of the facts, specifically the 
death of Homer W. Wickes. James Starbuck the 
' defendant's Salt Lake agent, was informed of 
Homer's death by Jim Wickes on or about August 
4, 1969 (Affidavit of James Starbuck, para. 6). A 
let1:€r from the insurance company to Betty Wickes 
dated August 7, 1969, signed by Mr. Rasband, 
offered condolences for the death of her husband. 
The Contract of Insurance provides that the 
policy period shall be as shown on the Declarations 
page and for such succeeding periods of six months 
thereafter as the required renewal premium is paid 
by the insured on or before the expiration date of 
the current policy period (Paragraph 1 of the Dec-
larations page). The policy further provides in 
Paragraph 7 of the Conditions portion of the policy 
that certain agreements are void and of no effect 
"if the premium for the policy is not paid when 
due." Paragraph 5 of the Conditions section of the 
policy provides that "the terms of this policy may 
not be waived or changed except by policy Endorse-
ment attached hereto, signed by an executive officer 
of the company." 
Demand was duly made 'upon the company for 
$10,000 as the amount of the "death benefit" owing. 
The company denied liability, claiming that the 
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policy had expired at midnight on August 1, 1969, 
because the renewal premium had not been paid 
within ten days from the due date. Subsequently, 
this lawsuit was initiated. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I. 
"S COVERAGE" IS LIFE INSURANCE AND AS SUCH 
MUST CONTAIN A 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS A GRACE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS AFTER 
THE EXPIRATION OF THE POLICY AND A LOSS WITHIN 
THAT TIME IS COVERED. 
POINT III. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREMIUM DUE BY THE IN-
SURANCE COMP ANY AFTER NOTICE OF THE LOSS IS A 
WAIVER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM AND 
COVERAGE IS EXTENDED FOR THE LOSS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
"S COVERAGE" IS LIFE INSURANCE AND AS SUCH 
MUST CONTAIN A 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD. 
The "S Coverage" constitutes life insurance. 
The policy provides that the insurance company will 
pay the 
amount stated as applicable to the insured 
designated for such coverage in the J?eclara-
tions in the event of the death of each msured 
which shall result directly and independently 
of all other causes from bodily injury caused 
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by . acciden~ and sustained by the insured 
while occupmg or through being struck by an 
automobile. . . . 
Section 31-11-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
defines life insurance as "Insurance on human lives 
and insurances appertaining thereto or connected 
therewith." 
Bkick's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition) de-
fines life insurance as follows: 
That kind of insurance in which the risk 
contemplated is the death of a particular per-
son; upon which event (if it occurs within a 
prescribed term, or according to the contract, 
whenever it occurs) the insurer engages to 
pay a stipulated sum to the legal representa-
tives of such person, or to a third person hav-
ing an insurable interest in the life of such 
person. 
Obviously, the "S Coverage" contemplated the 
risk of the death of one of the named insureds, and 
by any reasonable definition is, substantively, life 
insurance. Section 31-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953) provides in regard to policies of life insur-
ance that 
There shall be a provision that a grace 
period of 30 days, or, at the option of the 
insurer of one month of not less than 30 
days . : . shall be allowed within which the 
payment of any premium after the first may 
be made during which period of grace the 
policy shall continue in full force. . .. 
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The public policy of the State of Utah as ex-
pressed in Section 31-22-2 should be given effect. 
Citizens of the State of Utah, and the Appellant 
herein, are entitled to consider a policy which in-
sures the life of an individual, whether it is part of 
an automobile policy or not, as "life insurance," 
and are entitled to the normal expectations relating 
thereto as are required by Section 31-22-2. The stat-
utes of the State of Utah, and the insurance policy 
herein involved, should be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the public policy of the State of Utah 
and coverage should be extended to the Appellant 
herein. 
Chapter eleven of the Insurance Code contains 
requirements relating to the amount of capital funds 
that insurance companies are to have prior to being 
allowed to transact business within the State of 
Utah. In that same chapter various types of insur-
ance are defined, including life insurance (as above 
set forth). Section 31-11-6 provides that insurance 
against accidental death or injury to persons in or 
near a motor vehicle, when such insurance is issued 
as part of insurance on the vehicle, shall be deemed 
to be "vehicle insurance." Presumably, the Respond-
ent contends that by virtue of that section the "S 
Coverage" herein involved is "vehicle insurance" 
and not subject to the 30-day grace period. It is 
the Appellant's position that that section is not dis-
positive of this case, as it is primarily concerned 
with what types of insurance companies are required 
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to have what amounts of capital funds. To define 
"S Coverage" which is included in an automobile 
policy as "vehicle insurance" is illogical; it is as 
logical as concluding that the automobile insurance 
on Mr. Wickes' Oldsmobile is life insurance because 
it was (in the words of Section 31-11-2) "insurance 
on human lives and insurances appertaining thereto 
or connected therewith." 
Section 31-1-14, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
provides that provisions of the Insurance Code 
which relate to a particular kind of insurance pre-
vail over provisions relating to insurance in general. 
It is submitted that the portion of the Insurance 
Code defining "life insurance" and "vehicle insur-
ance" should be restricted to the issue of capital 
fund requirement, and should give way to the spe-
cific requirement imposed by Section 31-22-2. 
The insurance in question, i.e. the "S-Cover-
age," is obviously life insurance as it contemplates 
as the risk insured against the death of one of the 
named insureds. It requires no tortured reasoning 
or clever logic to conclude that it is in fact, and in 
substance, "life insurance," and thus must meet the 
requirement of Section 31-22-2 and contain a 30-day 
grace period. It is conceded by the parties to this 
lawsuit that the death of Homer Wickes occurred, 
and the premium was paid and accepted, within 30 
days from the expiration of the policy period. Thus, 
there was coverage and the defendant is liable for 
the amount payable under the "S Coverage." 
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POINT IL 
THERE WAS A GRACE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS AFTER 
THE EXPIRATION OF THE POLICY AND A LOSS WITHIN 
THAT TIME IS COVERED. 
The defendant claims that there was no cover-
age on August 2 because the premium had not been 
paid within ten days from August 1, and relies upon 
the "10-40 notice" as furnishing the basis for this 
contention. That notice provided that if the amount 
of the premium due was received by the company 
within ten days from August 1, then coverage would 
be continuous; however, if the premium was received 
aften ten days after the due date, but within 40 
days after the due date, then coverage was to be 
reinstated as of the date the premium was received 
by the insurance company. The plaintiff contends 
that a loss which occurs within a grace period is 
covered regardless of whether the premium is paid 
when due, or at all. 
The "10-40 notice" provides a period of time 
after the normal expiration of the policy within 
which the premium can be paid and which will, if 
paid, keep the policy in good standing. A "grace 
period" is defined as "a period beyond the due date 
of premium during which insurance is continued in 
force and during which payment may be made to 
keep policy in good standing," Black's Law Dictio~ 
ary (Fourth Edition). The terms of the "10-40 
notice" obviously give rise to a grace period. The 
policy, and any modifications thereof by the insurer, 
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attempted or otherwise, should be construed liberally 
in favor of the insured. In Tucker vs. New York 
Life Insurance Company, 155 P.2d 173, 107 Utah 
478 (1945) the following rule is stated: 
... The rule of strictissimi juris has been 
applied almost universally to insurance con-
tracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, 
has declared in favor of a liberal construction 
in favor of the insured to accomplish the pur-
pose for which the insurance was taken out 
and for which the premium was paid. 
Cases involving similar policies and notice pro-
visions have arisen in other jurisdictions. It is sub-
mitted that the weight of authority, and _the bet-
tered-reasoned view, is represented by cases such 
as Pickens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company, 144 S.E.2d 68 (So. Carolina 1965). 
In that case, in a situation similar to the one in-
volved here, the South Carolina Supreme Court held 
that provisions such as are found in the "10-40 
notice" give rise to a grace period. The court spe-
cifically rejected the contention of the insurance 
company that the expiration notice was merely an 
offer to renew. In that case the premium had been 
tendered to the insurance company within the 10-
day period. However, the weight of authority ap-
pears to be that the tender of the premium is not 
required to be made within the grace period. 
In Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama vs. Col-
quitt, 168 So.2d 251, the court stated the rule that: 
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. Whe:r; . a lo~s occurs within the grace 
period, givmg rise to an obligation by the 
underwriter to the insured for an unencum-
be_red sum at least equal to the unpaid pre-
mium, then the premium is deemed to have 
been paid and the term of the policy appro-
priately extended. 
The same rule is followed in Meadows v. Con-
tinental Assurance Company, 89 F.2d 256, (Fifth 
Cir. 1937) wherein it was held that where the death 
of the insured occurred during the grace period the 
policy must be paid, less the amount of any pre-
miums owing to the company by the insured. 
In Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec-
tions 7960 and 7961, it is said that a loss which 
occurs after the expiration of the grace period is 
not covered. However, Appleman states the general 
rule as "that if the insured dies during the grace 
period, his death is covered." 
Two jurisdictions have held that terms such as 
are found in the "10-40 notice" constitute merely an 
offer to renew and that if the premium is not re-
ceived within the period of time set forth, then the 
off er was not accepted and there was no insurance 
after the due date. McClure v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 148 S.E.2d 475 
(Georgia 1966); State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company vs. Robison, 461P.2d520 (Ariz. 
1970). It is submitted by the Appellant that these 
cases should not be followed in Utah as they are 
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poorly reasoned and do not declare in favor of "a 
liberal construction in favor of the insured to accom-
plish the purpose for which the insurance was taken 
out and for which the premium was paid," Tucker 
vs. New York Life Insurance Company, Supra. 
The better rule, which should be the law of this 
jurisdiction, is that such a notice gives rise to a 
grace period and that any loss occurring during the 
grace period is covered. The insurance company 
should be obligated to pay the amount due under 
the "S Coverage," less any premium which would 
be owing by the insured to the insurance company. 
POINT III. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREMIUM DUE BY THE IN-
SURANCE COMP ANY AFTER NOTICE OF THE LOSS IS A 
WAIVER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM AND 
COVERAGE IS EXTENDED FOR THE LOSS. 
In Point I and Point II in this Brief the Appel-
lant argues that the nature of the insurance, and 
the "10-40 notice," give rise to a grace period. Alter-
natively the Appellant contends that the "10-40 
notice" is immaterial and the terms thereof are in 
no way relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 
The "10-40 notice" does not meet the require-
ments of the statute or the policy, and cannot vary 
the terms of the basic policy of insurance. The policy 
itself provides that the terms thereof may not be 
changed except by an Endorsement attached thereto 
and signed by an officer of the insurance company. 
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In addition, Section 31-19-26, Utah Code Anrwtated 
( 1953) provides that "no modification of any insur-
ance contract shall be effective unless in writing 
executed by the insurer .... " The form of execution 
is defined in Section 31-19-20, Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953), and requires at least a facsimile signature 
of the insurer or an officer thereof. Section 31-19-18 
' 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides that "no 
insurer or its agent ... shall make any contract of 
insurance or agreement as to such contract, other 
than as plainly expressed in the policy issued there-
on. Any such understanding or agreement not so 
expressed shall be invalid." 
In Barnett v. State Automobile and Casualty 
Underwriters, 487 P.d 311 (Utah 1971) these stat-
utes were construed and held to mean that the basic 
policy of insurance cannot be modified by other writ-
ings or conduct not meeting the requirements of the 
statutes. Thus, whether the insureds herein com-
plied exactly with the terms of the "10-40 notice" 
is immaterial; that notice is an attempted modi-
fication of the basic terms of the policy, is invalid, 
and the Appellant herein may rightfully object 
thereto. 
The policy of insurance provides that the policy 
period is as shown on the Declarations page and for 
such succeeding periods of six months thereafter 
as the required renewal premium is paid by the 
insured on or before the expiration of the current 
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policy period. Thus, it is the clear intention of the 
policy itself that coverage terminates if the premium 
is not paid by the due date. However, the terms of 
the policy may be waived by the insurance company. 
The actions of the defendant in accepting the entire 
amount of the premium due constituted a waiver of 
the policy terms requiring prompt payment, the 
policy did not expire on August 1, 1969, and cover-
age is extended for the death of Homer Wickes. 
The basic rule is stated in Loftis v. Pacific 
Mutiwl Life Insurance Company of California, 114 
P.134, 38 Utah 532 (1911): 
That insurance companies may waive 
prompt payment of policies, although such 
payment is of the essence of the contract of 
insurance and may continue and treat policies 
in force after all rights thereunder had lapsed 
by reason of a provision therein that non-
payment of the premium or any part thereof 
shall cause the policy to become void and of 
no force or effect, is too well settled to admit 
of dispute. 
An extensive collection of cases are collected in 
7 A.L.R. 3d, 414, and supports the proposition that 
acceptance of a past-due premium after knowledge 
of the loss constitutes a waiver of the timely pay-
ment of the premium; this appears to be the over-
whelming view in all American jurisdictions. 
In Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, Sec-
tion 17.42, the rule is stated as follows: "acceptance 
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of unearned premiums is cogent evidence of an 
election to forgiving all known grounds of forfeit-
ure." It is further stated than "when an insurer 
receives and intentionally cashes a check for past-
due premium, it waives its right to hold the policy 
invalid for nonpayment of premium." 
In 43 AmJur 2d Section 1129 it is stated that 
On the other hand, in many cases it has 
been held, especially where the policy was of 
the type providing for forfeiture upon non-
payment of premiums, that at least in the 
absence of a provision making all premiums 
earned upon default, the insurer might rwt 
accept and retain after loss, with knowledge 
thereof, premiums covering the period of de-
fault, without being liable for the loss occur-
ring during such period. (Emphasis added.) 
In Seavey vs. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 889, 244 
Minn. 232, 52 A.L.R. 2d 1144 (1955), it was held 
that the invalidity of an automobile collision and 
liability policy for non-payment of premium was 
waived where the insurer, with full knowledge of 
the accident, accepted and retained the premium 
after the accident had occurred, the company had 
investigated the accident, and had required and re-
ceived the insured's cooperation in the investigation 
of the accident. 
In the case at hand, the record is clear that the 
loss occurred one day after the policy allegedly ex-
pired, that the company had notice of the loss and 
that it thereafter, with full knowledge of all the 
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facts, accepted the entire am9unt of the premium 
due. The law is clear that in such a situation cover-
age is continuous and the policy is not forfeited. 
Perhaps the leading Utah case in this area is 
Loft'is vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company 
of California, Supra. In that case a group of rail-
road employees had accident policies with the de-
fendant insurance company. An agreement was 
entered into between the employees and the insur-
ance company whereby the insurance company was 
to deduct monthly premiums from the wages due to 
the insureds by the railroad company. The policy 
contained the usual provisions prohibiting changes 
or modifications therein, provided that any failure 
to deduct the premium payment from the wages was 
at the insured's risk, and provided that the policy 
would be void if the monthly premiums were not 
duly paid. It appeared that the first policy period 
commenced May 28, 1908 and ended July 28 the 
same year. The second insurance period ended on 
September 28, 1908. The insured was killed on Octo-
ber 14, 1908. The insured did not earn sufficient 
wages during August and September to pay the 
premiums, but he did earn sufficient wages during 
October to pay the premium for that month and the 
premiums in default for the two prior months. The 
entire amount owing was forwarded by the railroad 
company to the insurance company after the insured 
was killed. The insurance company subsequently 
refunded the amount paid, which was tendered by 
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the. railroad company to the insurance company 
agam, but refused. The insurance company con-
tended that since the payments were in default at 
the time of the insured's death, the policy had lapsed 
and there was no coverage. Chief Justice Frick 
held that there was coverage and sustained the judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff. The court noted that 
whether a waiver of timely payment of the premium 
has taken place ordinarily depends upon the peculiar 
facts and circumstances of a given case. The court 
said that "where a waiver prevents a forfeiture, the 
law ordinarily permits a liberal construction to be 
placed on the acts of the party waiving with the view 
of bringing about a waiver of such a forfeiture." 
The court noted that no specid or formal act by the 
insurance company was required either to terminate 
the policy or to keep it in force. The insurance com-
pany, by demanding and receiving the past-due and 
the future installments of the premium could con-
tinue in force lapsed policies. The court said: 
If the policy was in force so as to auth-
orize the Appellant (insurance company) to 
demand and receive the premium due for 
August, it must likewise be held to have re-
mained in force for all other purposes. . . . 
That insurance companies may waive prompt 
payment of policies, although such. payment 
is of the essence of the contract of msurance 
and may continue and treat policies in force 
after all rights thereunder had lapsed by 
reason of a provision therein that non-pay-
ment of the premium or any part thereof 
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shall cause the policy to become void and of 
no force or effect is too well settled to admit 
?f dispu~ .... If an insurance company or 
its authorized agent, by its habits of business 
or by its acts or declarations, or by a custo~ 
to receive overdue premiums without objec-
tion, or by a custom not to exact prompt pay-
ment of the same, or, in brief, by any course 
of conduct has induced an honest belief in the 
mind of the policyholder, which is reasonably 
founded, that strict compliance with the stip-
ulation for punctual payment of premiums 
will not be insisted upon, but that the pre-
mium may be delayed without a forfeiture 
resulting therefrom, it will be deemed to have 
waived the right to claim the forfeiture, or 
it will be estopped from enforcing the same, 
although the policy expressly provides for for-
feiture for non-payment of premiums as stip-
ulated, and even though it is also conditioned 
that agents cannot waive forfeitures. 
The court in Loftis relies heavily on Joyce on 
Insurance, and quotes verbatim Section 1379: 
As a general rule, if the company has 
treated the policy as valid, and has sought to 
enforce payment of the premium, or has 
otherwise with knowledge recognized, by its 
own acts or declarations, or those of its agents, 
the policy as still subsisting, it waives thereby 
prior forfeitures. 
In the Loftis case, the insurance company ac-
cepted the past-due premium without knowledge of 
the insured's death and subsequently refunded the 
premium. In this case, State Farm Mutual treated 
the policy in full force and effect for the purpose of 
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collecting the $48.00 premium any time within ten 
days after the due date. If the policy was not in 
force at that time, then the company had no right 
to attempt to collect the premium and provide in the 
"10-40 notice" that coverage would be "continuous." 
In addition, with full knowledge of the loss, the com-
pany accepted the full amount of the premium due, 
thereby waiving timely payment of the premium and 
leading inescapably to the conclusion that coverage 
was extended at the time of the death of Homer 
Wickes. In the Affidavit of A. F. Smith, it appears 
that the "10-40 notice" was mailed out three days 
after the due date of August 1, 1969. The company 
cannot claim on one hand that there is no insurance 
when it comes time to pay the benefit, but claim on 
the other hand that it has the right to solicit and 
collect the premium payment. 
In Sullivan vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, 64 P.2d 351, 91 Utah 405 ( 1937), a quarterly 
life insurance premium payment was required to be 
made by October 6, 1932. On about October 15, the 
insured's wife talked to the insurance company and 
they indicated that the payment could be made after 
the grace period. After the grace period had expired 
the company accepted the entire premium due. The 
company subsequently contended that since the pay-
ment had been made after the grace period there 
was no insurance extended at the time of the loss, 
which also occurred after the expiration of the grace 
period. The court held that there was coverage and 
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that the company had waived timely payment of the 
premium. Even though the policy contained the 
usual provisions prohibiting modifications thereof 
except in writing, the court held that a general agent 
could waive timely payment of premiums regardless 
of provisions in the policy to the contrary. The court 
stated the general rule as: 
Where there has been a default in the 
payment of a premium or an assessment justi-
fying a forfeiture of the contract, such for-
feiture is waived if, with knowledge of all the 
facts, the insurer, either before or after the 
death of the insured, unconditionally accepts 
and retains the specific premium or assess-
ment for which the insured was delinquent. 
(At page 362.) 
The court in Sullivan also recognizes the rule 
that the company cannot treat the policy as valid 
for attempting to collect premiums, but claim that 
it was forfeited when claim is made for the benefits 
of the policy. The undisputed facts in this case dis.:.. 
close that the premium was overdue and that in the 
face of that knowledge, and with knowledge of the 
death of Homer Wickes, the company ( 1) assured 
the plaintiff that coverage would be continuous if 
she paid the amount of the premium due and (2) 
accepted the entire amount of the premium. It is 
submitted that the facts of this case fall squarely 
within those in Sullivan and that the Appellant is 
entitled to Judgment. 
Ellerbeck vs. Continental Casualty Company, 
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227 P.805, 63 Utah 530 (1924) involved a similar 
situation. A renewal certificate for a policy of 
health and accident insurance was mailed to the 
plaintiff in September, 1922. The certificate con-
tained the provision that the policy would be con-
tinued in force from October 8, 1922, for one year 
if the premium was paid before October 8, 1922. 
On October 1, November 1, and December 1 of that 
year, the insurance company mailed to the plaintiff 
statements requesting payment. Sometime between 
December 1 and December 8, 1922, a conversation 
was had between the company and the insured gen-
erally to the effect that the insured desired to main-
tain the insurance. No additional statements or 
demands were made upon the plaintiff to pay the 
premium. On February 23, 1923, a partial payment 
of $60.00 was paid on the premium and was accepted 
by the company. On March 1, the remainder of the 
premium was paid. On February 24, 1923, the plain-
tiff was taken to a hospital and it was admitted that 
the sickness causing the disability began sometime 
prior to February 24, 1923. The defendant con-
tended that there was no coverage between the date 
that the payment was actually due and the date that 
the payment was actually made. In affirming the 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and striking 
down this argument (similar to that made by the 
defendant in this case) the court used the following 
language: 
By the terms of the policy the plaintiff, 
24 
so long as the policy was not cancelled had 
th~ right to ma.ke the annual paymen'ts to 
remstate the pohcy so as to afford protection 
f?r accident~ a~ter the date of payment and 
sickness begmnmg 10 days thereafter. It is 
therefore contended by counsel for defendant 
that, even though a waiver of payment was 
made by the defendant, or an extension of 
credit given, such credit would not keep the 
policy in force between the date of payment 
as fixed in the policy and the date of actual 
payment. The courts usually do not concur 
in that construction of similar provisions in 
insurance policies. As stated, the insured had 
a legal right to reinstate his policy by making 
the annual payment as stipulated in the policy. 
His rights upon such payment are fixed by 
the terms or provision of the policy. Under 
the construction of the provision contended 
for by defendant's counsel, there would be 
nothing gained for plaintiff in this case by 
either a waiver or an extension of credit. 
In the instant case, the waiver of timely pay-
ment was made by the defendant's agent in Arizona, 
Mr. Osborne. This waiver was made after the al-
leged 10-day period, just as the waiver in the Eller-
beck case was made after the premium was more 
than two months overdue and more than one month 
after the expiration of the grace period. 
Parker vs. California State Life Insurance Com-
pany, 40 P.2d 175, 85 Utah 595 (1935) involved an 
accident insurance policy. The policy was originally 
issued on March 23, 1929 when the first annual 
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premium was paid. The insured did not pay the 
second premium which was due on March 23, 1930. 
On April 15, 1930, the insured upon condition that 
the policy be continued in force, entered into an 
agreement with the insurance company under the 
terms of which it was provided that the insured 
would pay a small amount of cash and execute and 
deliver to the insurance company a promissory note 
in a larger amount in payment of the second annual 
premium. The note provided that if the note was 
not paid on or before the date it became due, it 
thereupon automatically ceased to be a claim against 
the insured and the policy was then to be the same 
as if the cash had not been paid nor that agreement 
ever made. The note was not 1:m~ci '!.-!~Jon its du:J dL:,, 
September 23, 1930. On September 26, 1930, the 
defendant insurance company mailed a letter to the 
insured stating that the insurance was delinquent, 
suggested that they believed the default might be 
an oversight on the part of the insured, and enclosed 
a blank paper to be used by the insured in applying 
for reinstatement. The reinstatement application 
provided that the policy would not be considered 
reinstated until approved by the home office. They 
at that time offered to give an additional extension 
of time or to accept smaller installment payments. 
After the application and the letter were received, 
the insured filled out the application form and mailed 
it along with a small amount of money to the com-
pany. Before the application and the money were 
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received, the insured was killed. When the money 
was received by the company they knew of the death 
of the insured and immediately returned the money. 
The defendant contended that the policy had lapsed 
because of the failure of the insured to pay the note 
given for the premium on the date due. The court 
held that there was insurance, regardless of whether 
the company had accepted the partial payment or 
not. The court held that the company could not treat 
the policy in force for purposes of attempting to 
collect premiums and then turn around and claim 
that the policy was out of force for purposes of 
paying the benefits due thereunder. The court noted: 
... although the note executed on the 
23 of March provided that, if the note was 
not paid, it would automatically cease to be 
a claim against the maker, still the company 
continued its efforts to collect. It might be 
said that they were attempting to collect upon 
the premium, but that can make no difference. 
They were, in fact, attempting to collect from 
the insured money due as a payment in ad-
vance for the insurance. There is no justifi-
cation for attempting to collect either upon 
the note or the premium unless there was a 
recognition by the company of an obligation 
on their part under the policy. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The court further noted that where rights of 
forfeiture are created by contract they are for the 
benefit of the party privileged to declare the for-
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feiture, m this case the insurance company, and 
stated: 
Such party may, if he desires waive his 
rights. Forfeitures have not bee~ and are 
not now favored by the law. Courts have 
always given a liberal interpretation to the 
acts and conduct of a party holding a right 
of f?rfeitu~e. Ar:y acts or statements sug-
gestmg an mtent10n to keep a contract alive 
are liberally construed as a waiver of the 
right of forfeiture. 
In this situation, the Respondent, State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Company, obviously felt that the 
policy was in effect for purposes of attempting to 
collect the premium. As previously noted, the "10-
40 notice" was mailed out three days after the due 
date, i.e. August 1, 1969. The company, as the above 
cases so pointedly declare, cannot claim on one hand 
that there is no insurance when it comes time to pay 
the benefit due, but claim on the other that it has the 
right to solicit the premium payment. If the policy 
was in effect during the 10-day period between 
August 1 and August 11, 1969, for purposes of 
soliciting the premium, the policy was also in effect 
for purposes of paying the benefits the company is 
contractually obliged to pay. 
In Farrington vs. Granite State Fire Insurance 
Company, 232 P.2d 754, 120 Utah 109 (1951) it 
appeared that the insurance company had insured 
a building owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had 
received the policies in March, 1949, and shortly 
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thereafter had advised the defendant's agents of the 
condition of the building. Premium payments were 
made in the amount of $50.00 each on March 21 
and April 19. On April 22, the building was de-
stroyed by fire. On June 9, the company accepted 
the remaining portion of the premium. The com-
pany subsequently attempted to relieve itself of re-
sponsibility by claiming that there had been mis-
representations and concealments regarding the con-
dition of the building and that it was entitled to 
avoid the policy. All such facts were known, how-
ever, to the insurance company at the time it ac-
cepted the final premium payment on June 9. The 
company made no claim of a right to avoid or rescind 
the policy until after the lawsuit had been brought. 
Justice Crockett, writing the majority opinion, and 
holding that there was coverage, said: 
One who claims a right of rescission must 
act with reasonable promptness, and if after 
such knowledge, he does any substantial act 
which recognizes the contract as in force, 
such as the acceptance of the more than half 
of the premium would be, such an act would 
usually constitute a waiver of his right to 
rescind .... It, (the insurance company) can-
not treat the policy as void for the purpose 
of defense to an action to recover for a loss 
thereafter occurring, and at the same ti.me 
treat it as valid for the purpose of earnmg 
and collecting further premi urns. 
In the instant case, the defendant accepted the 
entire amount of the premium with full knowledge 
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of all of the facts; the fact situation comes squarely 
within that found in Farrington and thus the plain-
tiff is entitled to judgment. 
In American National Insurance Company vs. 
Cooper, 458 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1969) it was held that 
the insurance company waived its rights under the 
policy reinstatement provisions under which acci-
dent coverage was extended only for loss sustained 
after the date of reinstatement, where, following 
the insured's accident it received and retained a 
delinquent premium which covered the period of the 
accident with full knowledge of the accident. It 
appeared that the company did not require an appli-
cation for reinstatement, did not issue a conditional 
receipt, and otherwise regarded the policy as having 
been in force. 
The defendant herein attempts to excuse its 
acceptance of the entire amount of the premium for 
a shorter-than-normal policy period for the reason 
that premium rates were higher in Arizona than in 
Utah. It is submitted, however, that the insurance 
company cannot by internal manipulations apply 
the premiums in a manner calculated to defeat cover-
age for the period in question. In Bittinger vs. New 
York Life Insurance Company, 112 P.2d 621 (Calif. 
1941) the Supreme Court of California had before 
it a situation where the insurer had accepted a 
premium payment at a time when interest on a 
policy loan was due. There was also money owing 
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to the insured as a dividend payment. The company 
subsequently refunded a portion of the premium 
payment and then claimed that the remainder had 
been refunded in essence by applying it to term in-
surance (which conveniently expired prior to the 
insured's death). The California Supreme Court 
held that such an attempted rescission and internal 
manipulation as to the premiums so as to defeat 
coverage would not be allowed. The court said, 
"After accepting the money for one purpose, the 
insurer could not then, without the consent or even 
knowledge of the insured, apply the money in an-
other way which would result in converting the 
original policy to term insurance." Thus, the de-
fendant should not be allowed to claim that it applied 
the $48.00 premium in a manner which conveniently 
deprived Betty Wickes of coverage for the critical 
period in question. There is no evidence that Betty 
Wickes, or any other member of the family, were 
ever advised by the insurance company that it was 
accepting the $48.00 check at an alleged higher pre-
mium rate for a shorter period of time. The proper 
course of action for the company would have been 
to have billed, or otherwise notified, the Wickes 
family of the higher premium rate and let them 
elect to either pay the higher premium or to accept 
a shorter term of insurance. At no time was the 
Wickes family ever advised that premium rates were 
higher in Arizona. 
Two Utah cases have been discovered which 
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might be cited for the proposition that acceptance 
of the premium after the loss would not constitute 
a waiver of the timely payment of the premium. 
Ballard vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 21 
P.2d 847, 82 Utah 1 (1933); Cooper v. Forrester's 
Underwriters, Inc., 275 P.2d 675, 2 U.2d 373 
( 1954). However, in these cases it clearly appears 
that the insurance company did not know of the 
loss at the time it accepted the premium and thus 
one of the critical elements of waiver, i.e. full knowl-
edge of all of the facts, was not present. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and the law are clear as to each of 
the points on appeal. 
POINT I. 
1. "S Coverage" is life insurance. 
2. Life insurance must have a 30-day grace 
period. 
3. The loss occurred within the grace period, 
the premium was paid within the grace period, and 
thus the loss is covered. 
POINT II. 
1. The "10-40 Notice" gives rise to a 10-day 
grace period. 
2. The loss, i.e. the death of Homer Wickes, 
occurred within the grace period. 
3. The premium owing need not necessarily 
32 
be paid prior to the loss or prior to the expiration 
of the grace period. 
4. The usual rule is that a loss occurring with-
in the grace period is covered, regardless of whether 
the premium was paid, subject only to the Com-
pany's right to an offset. 
POINT III. 
1. The policy by its terms expired on August 
1, 1969. 
2. Homer Wickes was killed in such a manner 
as to entitle the plaintiff herein to the $10,000 death 
benefit on August 2, 1969. 
3. The insurance company had full knowledge 
of all the facts not later than August 4, 1969. 
4. The plaintiff herein was assured by an 
agent of the company in late August, 1969, that if 
she paid the premium that coverage would be con-
tinuous and straight through from August 1. 
5. The full amount of the premium due was 
mailed by the plaintiff to the defendant on August 
13, 1969, and the check was accepted and cashed. 
6. The "10-40 notice" cannot modify the basic 
terms of the contract and can be of no benefit to the 
defendant herein. 
7. An insurance company can waive the pro-
visions of its own policy. 
8. An insurance company cannot treat the 
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policy in effect for the purpose of collecting pre-
miums, but claim that it is not in effect for purposes 
of meeting its obligations thereunder. 
9. Acceptance of a late premium payment con-
stitutes a waiver of the timely payment of the pre-
mium and a loss of which the company had knowl-
edge occurring prior to the acceptance of the pre- : 
mium by the company is covered. 
! 
The judgment in favor of the defendant should I 
be reversed and judgment should be entered in favor I 
of the plaintiff as prayed for in her Complaint. In 
the alternative, if the court feels that there are fac-
tual issues relating to waiver or estoppel, the matter 
should be remanded for trial in the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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